By: PETER HAYS GRIES
NY Times, August 23, 2012 

LAST week, anti-Japanese protests swept nearly a dozen Chinese cities. Angry demonstrators overturned Toyotas while Japanese restaurants and businesses were vandalized. In the central Chinese city of Chengdu, where thousands protested, some banners declared, “Even if China is covered with graves, we must kill all Japanese!”

The immediate cause for the demonstrations was a flare-up over a few disputed, uninhabited islands controlled by Japan. (China calls them the Diaoyus; Japan calls them the Senkakus). On Aug. 15, Chinese nationalists landed and planted flags on the islands before being deported. Japanese nationalists retaliated by swimming ashore from nearby boats, further inflaming Chinese passions.

The rage of China’s crowds is genuine, and its roots lie in China’s nationalist ideology. The Chinese Communist Party uses its educational and propaganda systems to socialize citizens into a particular understanding of history. Maoist triumphalism has been eclipsed since the mid-1990s by a new “victim narrative” about Chinese suffering.

To most Chinese, the Japanese are “devils,” and the hatred reaches far into the past — from China’s humiliating loss in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-5 to World War II-era atrocities like the Rape of Nanking. Anti-Japanese anger has both ethical and visceral dimensions, sustaining it unlike other more fleeting forms of nationalism.

And although Chinese nationalist rage is primarily aimed at Japan, it is also directed toward the United States. As Chinese nationalists see it, America is the cause of China’s continuing problems with both Taiwan and Japan. If it were not for the “American imperialists” inserting the United States Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait during the Korean War, they say, Taiwan would long ago have been reunified with mainland China, erasing that “national humiliation.” And Japan’s continuing impertinence is also America’s fault: the United States’ alliance with Japan gives Japanese nationalists the gumption to defy a rising China.

The statements of American politicians further stoke Chinese anger at the United States. Speaking in Ohio late last week, the presumptive Republican vice-presidential nominee, Paul D. Ryan, accused China of stealing intellectual property, blocking access to its markets and manipulating the exchange rate. “President Obama promised he would stop these practices,” Mr. Ryan declared. “He said he’d go to the mat with China. Instead, they’re treating him like a doormat. We’re not going to let that happen.”

Mr. Ryan’s views echo those of Mitt Romney, who has promised if elected to declare China a “currency manipulator.” This could lead to punitive tariffs on Chinese imports and a possible trade war.

There is a long history of challengers using China to attack incumbents during presidential elections. Most famously, in 1992, Bill Clinton accused President George Bush of coddling the “butchers of Beijing” following the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989.

While there is some antipathy toward China in the Democratic Party, particularly among labor unions and human rights activists, anti-Chinese sentiment these days comes mostly from the right. Economic conservatives don’t like the income redistribution and government regulation they associate with socialism; the Christian right fears the atheism of “Godless” Communism; and libertarians don’t like any government at all, let alone the authoritarian government of China.

China-bashing will therefore be good election year politics for the Romney-Ryan ticket. But it will be bad for America’s relations with China and could undermine our national security. Many Chinese are already suspicious of American intentions, and ideologically driven rhetoric from across the Pacific will only confirm their worst fears.

Worse, the Communist Party is currently undergoing its own leadership transition, and it is happening at a time when popular nationalism is bringing people into the streets. Because the party bases its legitimacy in large part on its nationalist credentials, no party leader is likely to quiet the nationalists until the new leadership is finalized.

Lacking a secure foundation of mutual trust, American-Chinese relations today remain susceptible to the random accidents of history that have plagued them in the past. In 1999, the mistaken NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade, Serbia, killed three and led to huge anti-American protests across China. And in 2001, the collision between a Chinese jet and an American surveillance plane led to a Chinese pilot’s death and an American crew’s being detained for two weeks.

If comparable accidents occur during this fall’s leadership transitions in both countries, popular pressure for more confrontational policies in both China and the United States will be more difficult to contain — and will increase the likelihood of conflict in Asia.

By: Michelle Borok 23, August 2012, Giant Robot

South Koreans want the world to know about Dokdo, aka Takeshima, aka Liancourt Rocks. Korean soccer player, Park Jong Woo scored the biggest audience so far for the Dokdo debate when Korea beat Japan for the Olympic bronze, but lost his chance to be a part of the medal ceremony. He may not get the medal awarded at all, but he does get out of having to do compulsory military service. Before Park held up his handmade sign on the world stage, Koreans in London were handing out flyers about Dokdo to the international tourists around the city. Korea really wants us to know what’s going on, because so far, no one seems to care, no matter how hard they flash mob for the cause.

Dokdo is found in Korea’s written records as early as 512, during the Shilla Dynasty. The islands show up in Japanese written records in 1693, and are eventually known in the Japanese record as Takeshima. Korea promptly sent an emissary to Japan to let them know back then that the islands were Korean territory, and Japan backed off. In 1849 a French whaling ship charted the island, and in typical European fashion, made up their own name for it, Liancourt Rocks. Japan came back again in 1876, and once more Korea protested. Japan apologized, again, and left it alone until the peninsula and all its territories were under Japanese control during 35 years of occupation. The Japanese were stoked on the prime sea lion hunting location.

After liberation in 1945, Dokdo was Korean territory again. The US used the islands as a bombing range in 1952 and stationed US troops there for a short time. The islands have been more than just a pile of rocks for a very long time. They are home to good fishing grounds, untapped gas deposits, and did I mention the sea lions?

So, now what’s to be done? Takeshima has become a platform for Japanese conservatives to stand their ground against outside agencies telling Japan what to do, and it’s also been a talking point for holding on to dwindling natural resources close to home. Dokdo has long been a focal point of Korean efforts to right the wrongs of a traumatic past. Dokdo was the starting point for the annexation of the Korean peninsula in 1910, and represents much more. No one is actively campaigning for the recognition of “Liancourt Rocks”, but who really cares about “rocks” anyhow? How can all parties move forward?

Japan doesn’t like to apologize for war crimes, and it doesn’t like to concede.  Takeshima gives steady fodderto the conservatives who influence government, education, and foreign policy. Currently airing Korean television dramas about freedom fighters during the occupation are popular and get consistently high ratings.  Dokdo makes regular appearances in Korean media and has become a focal point of national pride. If the closure Koreans need hasn’t been granted (if Han allows for any closure at all) then this, and other issues will be ongoing, straining both sides of the argument for future generations to wrestle with.

We’ll be hearing about Dokdo/Takeshima for a long time, until some agreement can be made about how to create a future with less tension, more understanding, and efforts are made to heal from a difficult past.